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Frans F. Slatter* Seat Belts and
Contributory Negligence
I. Introduction
There are now thirty-six cases mentioned in the Canadian and
English reports where it has been argued that the failure to wear a
seat belt amounts to contributory negligence. I The defence was
successfully made out in only ten of these cases, with damages
being reduced by five per cent to thirty-three and a third per cent
under the applicable contributory negligence statutes. 2 This volume
of litigation would not provoke comment were it not for the division
of judicial opinion and the confusion of judicial thinking to be found
in these conflicting decisions. Even in England where it was thought
that the seat belt defence was well-established, some uncertainty
recently arose over the availability of the defence. 3 This doubt has
now been removed by the Court of Appeal, 4 but this decision has
yet to have an impact on the Canadian scene, where the position
remains unsettled. 5 The present uncertain state of the law makes it
useful to attempt to lay down a theoretical framework within which
the issue can be discussed. The seat belt cases are also of interest
and worthy of discussion for a number of other reasons. First of all
*Frans F. Slatter, LL.B. Dalhousie, 1977; Law Clerk to Ritchie J., Supreme Court
of Canada
1. Fourteen of the English cases are listed in Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286;
[1975] 3 All E.R. 520; [1975] R.T.R. 518 (C.A.), rev'g [1974] 3 All E.R. 517;
[1974] R.T.R. 528 (Q.B.D.), and see Owens v. Brimmell, [1976] 3 All E.R. 765;
[1977] R.T.R. 82 (Q.B.D.). The twenty-one Canadian cases are cited by province,
infra, notes 124-131.
2. Yuan v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295; 62 W.W.R. 645 (B.C.S.C.)
(damages reduced 25%); Jackson v. Millar, [1973] 1 O.R. 399; 31 D.L.R. (3d)
263 (C.A.) (10%); Haley v. Richardson (1974), 9 N.B.R. (2d) 318; 1 A.P.R. 318
(S.C., T.D.), var'd 10 N.B.R. (2d) 653 (S.C., A.D.) (20%); Earl v. Bourdon
(1975), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 646 (B.C.S.C.) (not given); Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973]
2 All E.R. 74; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 (Q.B.D.) (5%); McGee v. Francis Shaw &
Co., [1973] R.T.R. 409 (Q.B.D.) (331/3%); Parnell v. Shields, [1973] R.T.R. 414
(Q.B.D.) (20%); Toperoff v. Mor, [1973] R.T.R. 419 (Q.B.D.) (25%); Drage v.
Smith, [1975] R.T.R. I (Q.B.D.) (15%); Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286;
[1975] 3 All E.R. 520; [1975] R.T.R. 518 (C.A.) (20%)
3. See K. Williams, Comment (1975), 53 Can. B. Rev. 113 at 116; K. Williams,
Correspondence (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 497
4. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 (C.A.)
5. Infra, notes 124-131
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they are important in that the reasoning in them is applicable by
analogy to any case in which the failure to use safety equipment is
an issue. Secondly, they represent an interesting application of the
principles of contributory negligence, in that it is not argued that the
plaintiff contributed to the accident, but rather that he contributed to
the damage. Finally, the topic deserves attention because of recent
legislative activity in the area.
The defence of contributory negligence in relation to the non-use
of a safety device involves the proof of four factors. Initially it must
be shown that the plaintiff was exposed to some unreasonable risk
against which a reasonable person would take precautions. Then it
must be shown that the safety device in question is generally
effective either in reducing the risk of an accident, or alternatively
in reducing the damage that would normally result if that risk
materialized. Thirdly, it must be shown that the device was
available to the plaintiff, but that the plaintiff did not make use of it.
Finally, it must be shown that the plaintiff's neglect in failing to use
the device in fact caused the plaintiff's injury to be worse or, put
another way, that the device if used would actually have prevented
some of the resulting damage. The application of each of these
requirements to the use of seat belts will be discussed in turn, after
which the apportionment procedure and the legislative activity in
the field will be examined.
II. The Unreasonable Risk
In order to find the plaintiff contributorily negligent it is necessary
to show that he failed to take reasonable care to ensure his own
safety. 6 In the seat belt cases this translates into showing that the
plaintiff's failure to wear the seat belt was unreasonable conduct on
his part. This in turn requires that the defendant show that there was
present some danger or risk of such magnitude that it was
unreasonable for the plaintiff not to take steps to ensure his own
safety. It is on this point, the risk involved in being a driver or
passenger in a motor vehicle, that a good deal of the difference in
judicial opinion rests. 7 Is the chance of being involved in an
accident and suffering injury while on Canadian highways an
"unreasonable" risk?
6. Davies v. Swan Motor Co. (Swansea) Ltd., [1949] 2 K.B. 291; [1949] 1 All
E.R. 620 (C.A.)
7. Drage v. Smith, [1975] R.T.R. I at4E
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It would seem clear that the reasonable person is aware that there
are accidents on the highways, and that damage results from many
of these accidents. Indeed he may even have seen such an
occurrence from his seat on the Clapham omnibus. But this is not
enough, for the reasonable person does not take precautions to
prevent every risk that is foreseeable. It is necessary that the risk be
such that the reasonable person would think it improper not to take
some precaution.8 The reasonable person would, however, take
account of even a relatively small risk. 9 It should be noted that it is
not necessary for the plaintiff to actually foresee the exact risk that
arises, as was suggested in one case where the seat belt defence was
not recognized. 10 It is only necessary that the general risk be
foreseeable by a reasonable person. 11
In addition to it being clear that there are a great number of
accidents on Canadian highways, it is also notorious that death is
not an uncommon result of these accidents. This is significant
because in determining what risks the reasonable person would
guard against "not only the greater risk of injury, but the risk of
greater injury is a relevant factor." 
12
Another factor that is relevant is the cost involved in abating or
not running the risk, as compared to the benefits to be derived from
the activity in question. The greater the relative cost, the more the
reasonable person may be inclined to take the risk without the
necessary precautions. In Bolton v. Stone, Lord Reid suggested that
this was not a factor to be considered, 13 but there is a considerable
body of opinion to the contrary. 14 That the cost should be
considered is only reasonable, for no one would argue that everyone
should give up driving, or drive constantly at five miles per hour,
8. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850; [1951] 1 All E.R. 1078 (H.L. (E))
9. Id. at 868; [1951] All E.R. at 1086, and Pasternack v. Poulton, I"1973] 2 All
E.R. 74 at 77-78; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at 480 D: Overseas Tankship (U.K.) (Ltd.)
v. Miller Steamship Co. Pty. (The Wagon Mound (No. 2)), [1967] 1 A.C. 617;
[1966] 3 W.L.R. 498; sub nom. The Wagon Mound (No. 2), [1966] 2 All E.R. 709
(P.C.)(N.S.W.)
10. Smith v. Blackburn, [1974] R.T.R. 533; [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 229 (Q.B.D.),
where the defendant drove "madly" up a freeway ramp the wrong way.
I I. Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837; [1963] 1 All E.R. 705 (H.L.(S.)),
Drage v. Smith, [1975] R.T.R. I at 5F
12. J. Fleming, The Law of Torts (4th ed. Sydney: The Law Book Co., 1971) at
114
13. [1951] A.C. 850 at 867; [1951] 1 All E.R. 1078 at 1086
14. Fleming, The Law of Torts, supra, note 12 at 116; A. Linden, Canadian
Negligence Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972) at 15-17
Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence
because this is sure to end all accidents. 15 The social cost would be
too high, and each person must bear some risks for the general
benefit of all persons. In the seat belt cases this factor must weigh
against the plaintiff. In a car equipped with seat belts the cost to the
plaintiff of using them is but a few seconds of the passenger's time.
The belts are "easily and quickly put on and worn" 16 and the fact
that they might be somewhat uncomfortable for some people, 17 or
that they may "spoil a special evening dress" 18 would hardly seem
a good reason to run the risks attached to not using them.
If the relative cost test was used alone, it would seem that the
reasonable motorist would be required to wear his seat belt. There
are, however, a number of arguments presented in support of the
opposite view. First, it has been submitted that a plaintiff should not
be held to be negligent for not wearing a seat belt, as this would lead
to ridiculous results. It is said that such a decision would force the
courts to find negligence in a driver who did not wear a helmet, did
not wear a shoulder harness, did not drive an armoured car, 19 did
not avoid smaller cars that are more susceptible to damage, 20 or did
not carry a fire extinguisher. 21 The answer to this argument is found
in another argument that is used against the seat belt defence, which
is that it is not every prudent act that gives rise to a duty at law.
22
This latter statement is correct, and if one takes the view that
accidents are so rare, and preventable damage so slight that the
reasonable person would not take them into account, then it is not
negligent to fail to use a seat belt. It does not, however, logically
follow that if seat belts must be used, all these other precautions
must also be used. The cost of each precaution must be measured
against the likelihood of the occurrence of, and the probable extent
of preventable damage arising out of the risk they are each
designated to counteract, in accordance with the principles stated
15. Daborn v. Bath Tramways Co., [1946] 2 All E.R. 333 at 336 (C.A.)
16. Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 2 All E.R. 74 at 77-78; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at
480 D; Earl v. Bourdon (1975), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 646 at 655
17. McGee v. Francis Shaw & Co., [1973] R.T.R. 409
18. Freeborn v. Thomas, [1975] R.T.R. 16 at 19 H
19. MacDonnell v. Kaiser (1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d) 104 at 108; 3 N.S.R. 1965-69
613 at 629 (S.C., T.D.); Van Spronsen v. Gawor, [197112 O.R. 729 at 731; 19
D.L.R. (3d) 53 at 55 (Co. Ct.)
20. Hunt v. Schwanke, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 541 at 543-44 (Alta. S.C., T.D.)
21. Chapman v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7 at 14-15 (Q.B.D.); Bolton v. Stone,
[1951] A.C. 850; [1951] 1 All E.R. 1078
22. Chapman v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7 at 14-15; MacDonnell v. Kaiser (1968), 3
N.S.R. 1965-69 613; 68 D.L.R. (2d) 104
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above. If it appears that head injuries and fires are very rare in
automobile accidents then helmets and fire extinguishers are not
needed. Further, the cost of large or armoured cars may speak
against their general use. Likewise the seat belt issue must be
decided on its own merits. Recognizing the seat belt defence will
not open the floodgates of safety.
Secondly, in discussing the question of the risk involved in
driving, it is sometimes argued 2 3 that the plaintiff should be entitled
to assume that other persons will not act negligently, and there is
authority for this view. 24 This assumption should only be allowed,
however, in situations where other persons are not so habitually
negligent that the reasonable person would begin to make allowance
for them. 25 The argument therefore begs the question, for in
deciding if the risk of the road is such that the plaintiff must take
reasonable care for his own safety, one must ask how many
negligent drivers are about. If they are numerous, then the plaintiff
may not assume that others will drive carefully, for the risk that they
represent is an unreasonable one. If they are few, then he is entitled
to make this assumption for the reasonable person would ignore the
risk they create. However, even if one is prepared on grounds of
public policy to allow the plaintiff to make this assumption, that is
not the end of the matter. Not only bad drivers, but bad weather,
bad roads and bad equipment contribute to accidents, and there is no
suggestion that the plaintiff may assume these factors away. It is the
cumulative danger of the road that calls for the wearing of the seat
belt. A rule ignoring the negligent driver will only reduce, not
eliminate, the danger facing the potential victim.
Finally, there has been some support for the view that it is an
interference with individual freedom of choice to force a person to
wear a belt where, for whatever personal reasons, he does not wish
to. 2 6 There are two answers to this argument. First, the standard of
23. MacDonnell v. Kaiser id. at 629; 68 D.L.R. (2d) at 108; Van Spronsen v.
Gawor, [1971] 2 O.R. 729 at 731; 19 D.L.R. (3d) 53 at 55; Hunt v. Schwanke,
[1972] 2 W.W.R. 541 at 543; contra, Drage v. Smith, [1975] R.T.R. 1 at 4F;
Parnell v. Shields, [1973] R.T.R. 414 at4l8F
24. Toronto Railway Co. v. King, [1908] A.C. 260 at 269; 12 O.W.R. 40 at 47
(P.C.); contra, Jones v. Livox Quarries Ld., [1952] 2 Q.B. 608 (C.A.); South
Australian Ambulance v. Wahlheim (1948), 77 C.L.R. 215 at 229; Bruce v.
McIntyre, [1955] S.C.R. 251 at 254; [1955] 1 D.L.R. 785 at 787-88
25. Grant v. Sun Shipping Co., [1948] A.C. 549 at 567; [194812 All E.R. 238 at
247 (H.L. (Sc.))
26. Froom v. Butcher, [1974] 3 All E.R. 517 at 520, rev'd [1976] Q.B. 286 at 294
Ont. Leg. Debates (November 25, 1975 and December 2, 1975)
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care in negligence has always been an objective one. Thus it should
not matter that the plaintiff held an honest belief that seat belts are
dangerous, 27 that the plaintiff had never seen a seat belt, 28 or that
the plaintiff never gave any thought to wearing a belt. 29 What the
plaintiff's subjective view of the situation is, or what he thinks or
believes is good for himself at the time, cannot have any effect on
the reasonable person standard against which his conduct must be
measured. 30 The second answer is that if the plaintiff insists on the
freedom to act according to his personal views or comfort, he
cannot then expect the defendant to bear the loss that results when
his decision turns out to be the wrong one. "Any person who
conscientiously objects to the wearing of a seat belt must recognize
that he dispenses with the use of an accepted safety device at his
peril".31
In 1974, there were 610,836 reported accidents in Canada,
resulting in 6,373 deaths and 204,587 injuries. 32 These figures
represent 5.9 accidents for every one million vehicle miles driven in
Canada. 33 One out of every ten cars is involved in an accident each
year. 34 It is dstimated that over the next forty years, thirty-two per
cent of the current population of Ontario will be killed or injured in
automobile accidents. 35 Whether these facts amount to such a risk
as to cause a reasonable person to act for his own safety is of course
a matter of opinion. One suspects that some of those who say it is
not do so because they are offended at the thought that a negligent
defendant who has caused an accident will be able to throw some
responsibility on the plaintiff, who has at most worsened his own
injuries. 36 The feeling is that the "motorist who drives carefully and
27. Id. at 294E; [1975] 3 All E.R. at 526
28. Geier v. Kujawa, [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 364
29. James v. Parsons, [1975] R.T.R. 20, where Kilner Brown J., distinguished
McGee v. Shaw, [1973] R.T.R. 409 on the basis that the plaintiff there had
consciously decided not to wear the belt.
30. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 294G, 295E; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at
526-27
31. Drage v. Smith, [1975] R.T.R. 1 at 5H; see also Froom v. Butcher, id. at
293D, 296F; [1975] 3 All E.R. at 525, 528
32. Statistics Canada, Canada Yearbook 1974(Ottawa: Informatign Canada, 1974)
at 48
33. Statistics Canada, Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1974) at 12
34. Insurance Bureau of Canada, You and Your Car Insurance (Pamphlet)
35. Ont. Leg. Debates (December 2, 1975) at 1185
36. Van Spronsen v. Gawor, [1971] 20.R. 729 at 731; 19 D.L.R. (3d) 53 at 55
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lawfully", the "innocent injured victim" ' 37 should not be
penalized, especially where the defendant has been grossly
negligent or where the loss will really fall on an insurance
company. 38 Here the conclusion precedes the reasoning, for the
whole purpose of the judicial inquiry is to decide if the injured
victim is in fact innocent. Whatever the motivation behind the
decisions, there are two possible answers that can be given. 39 First,
it could be decided that the risk of driving is always unreasonable,
and that it is always negligent not to wear a seat belt. This seems to
be the position in England since the Court of Appeal decision in
Froom v. Butcher. 
40
The second approach would be to argue that while it is not always
negligent not to wear a seat belt, it may be in some individual cases.
The condition of the road, the hour of the day, the condition of the
car and the length of the journey would have to be looked at in each
case. Thus one might suspect that even if it is not always negligence
to not wear a seat belt, it would be so where the roads are "very icy
and dangerous to travel",41 where the express purpose of the trip
was to test the performance of a particularly high powered car, 42 or
where the plaintiff had had occasion to tell the driver to be more
careful. 43 This second approach appears to have been taken in some
cases.
44
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal has said 45 that failure to
wear a seat belt is not per se negligence. It is not clear whether the
37. MacDonnell v. Kaiser (1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d) 104 at 107-08; 3 N.S.R.
1965-69 613 at 628
38. Smith v. Blackburn, [1974] R.T.R. 533 at 536C; [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 229 at
235. It is generally thought that the courts may not take the insurance position into
account, even though, as will be seen later (infra, note 112), the legislature may
have. See Williams, supra, note 3 at 116
39. A. Linden, Seat Belts and Contributory Negligence (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev.
475 at 484
40. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520
41. Beaver v. Crowe (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 114 at 117 (N.S.S.C., T.D.)
42. James v. Parsons, [1975] R.T.R. 20 at 29 ((Q.B.D.), where negligence was
not found.
43. McGee v. Francis Shaw & Co., [1973] R.T.R. 409
44. Chapman v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7 at 13B, G; Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973]
2 All E.R. 74 at 77; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at480C; Van Spronsen v. Gawor, [1971]
2 O.R. 729 at 730; 19 D.L.R. (3d) 53 at 54; Dover v. Gooddy (1972), 29 D.L.R.
(3d) 639 at 639; 3 N. & P.E.I.R. 143 at 144 (P.E.I.S.C.); Durant v. Tweel (1975),
8 A.P.R. 539 at 569; 8 N. & P.E.I.R. 539 at 569 (P.E.I.S.C.); Challoner v.
Williams, [1974] R.T.R. 221 at 224 A (Q.B.D.)
45. Heppell v. Irving Oil Co. (1974), 6 N.B.R. (2d) 327; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 476
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Court simply means that the defence must also prove causation, as
Stevenson J. interpreted these words, 46 or if they are saying that
negligence must be proven in each particular factual situation. Even
if one does not accept the first position, it would not seem to be
open to rule as a matter of law (in the absence of a statutory
provision) that the defence can never prove that the failure to wear a
seat belt was negligence. The second argument must always be
available in factual situations where an extreme risk of damage was
present.
In summary, there are two clear views on whether the roads
represent such an unreasonable risk that the motorist is under a legal
duty to wear his seat belt. Shaw J., who is representative of one
side, has expressed the opinion that an accident is a "vague and
distant contingency", and concluded
The regular toll of death and injury on the highways is tragic
indeed; but one hopes that travelling in a motor car does not yet,
and never will, involve the incidence of imminent risk to life and
limb. A principle of law based on the assumption that it does, has
a morbid tinge and is not salutary or necessary in the public
interest. 47
On the other hand there are those who feel that the risks of the road
have reached the point where the reasonable person must take care.
The risk is thought to be such that, on the application of the legal
principles stated above, it is unreasonable conduct not to wear a seat
belt. Whether the optimists or the pessimists will prevail in Canada
remains to be seen. It is submitted, however, that most of the
arguments presented against the recognition of the seat belt defence
will not stand up under close examination. The ease with which the
belts can be used combined with what danger can clearly be shown
to exist in using the highways is sufficient to establish a risk against
which the reasonable person would take precautions.
III. The General Effectiveness of the Device
In order to find contributory negligence in the plaintiff for failure to
(S.C., A.D.); also Beaver v. Crowe (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 114;Dover v. Gooddy
(1972), 3 N. & P.E.I.R. 143; 29 D.L.R. (3d) 639; Best v. Young (1976), 13
N.B.R. (2d) 596; 13 A.P.R. 596 (S.C., Q.B.D.)
46. Haley v. Richardson (1974), 9 N.B.R. (2d) 318; 1 A.P.R. 318 (S.C.,
Q.B.D.), var'd 10 N.B.R. (2d) 653 (S.C., A.D.); Zurtt v. Davis (1976), 14
N.B.R. (2d) 541; 15 A.P.R. 541 (S.C., Q.B.D.)
47. Challoner v. Williams, [1974] R.T.R. 221 at 224D, F
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use a safety device, it is not sufficient to show that there was an
unreasonable risk present. One must also demonstrate either that the
safety device is of value in preventing the type of accident that is
foreseeable, or that should that risk materialize the safety device
will usually reduce the resulting damage. 48 Clearly there can be no
negligence if the device is in general ineffective, even if in the one
particular case it might have been effective. Again, the trouble
involved in taking the protective step must be looked at. As has
been mentioned the inconvenience in using a seat belt is very slight,
and so the reasonable person would use it in the face of an
unreasonable risk even if it only offered a small amount of
protection.
Many of the early cases seem to have been decided against the
defendant as much because of a failure to prove the effectiveness of
seat belts as for any other reason. So Dubinsky J. said in 1968 that
"the effectiveness of seat belts is still in the realm of speculation
and controversy". 49 There are two lines of attack used. Either it is
suggested that seat belts do not reduce damage, or it is suggested
that they actually increase damage. In a variation on the first
approach it is sometimes said that injuries with a seat belt will not be
less severe, just different; that the plaintiff is just trading one type of
injury for another. 50 There is in fact some evidence that a seat belt
can cause injury, especially when improperly used, but in the vast
majority of cases these injuries will be less severe than those that
would otherwise have resulted. 51
The argument that seat belts in fact cause more injury revolves
around certain stock situations. First of all, it is said that in
accidents causing fire or submersion the seat belt would trap the
victim in the car thereby causing greater injury. 52 In fact these two
situations occur in less than one per cent of all collisions. 53
48. Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 2 All E.R. 74 at 77; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at
480A
49. MacDonnell v. Kaiser (1968), 3 N.S.R. 1965-69 613 at 627; 68 D.L.R. (2d)
104 at 107; Smith v. Blackburn, [1974] R.T.R. 533 at 535-36; [1974] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 229 at 234-35;Freeborn v. Thomas, [1975] R.T.R. 16 at 18-19 (Q.B.D.)
50. Belanger v. Reid (1974), 11 N.B.R. (2d) 94 at 104; 7 A.P.R. 94 at 104 (S.C.,
A.D.); Van Spronsen v. Gaivor, [1971] 2O.R. 729 at 731; 19 D.L.R. (3d) 53 at 55
51. Williams, supra, note 3 at 120;Burtt v. Davis (1976), 14 N.B.R. (2d) 541 at
543; 15 A.P.R. 541 at 543, and seeDonn v. Schacter, [1975] R.T.R. 238, where a
passenger tripped on a belt while leaving a car and was injured.
52. Froom v. Butcher, [1974] 3 All E.R. 517 at 520, rev'd [1976] Q.B. 286;
[1975] 3 All E.R. 520
53. Nova Scotia Registry of Motor Vehicles,Drivers' Handbook at 51
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Needless to say the reasonable person does not ignore ninty-nine per
cent of the risk in order to protect against one per cent of it. Actually
the real answer to this argument is that even in these rare situations
the seat belt is valuable. Without it the passenger is liable to be
knocked unconscious, and thus will be unable to make efforts to
free himself. The second argument made is that it is safer to be
thrown clear of the car in an accident. In fact the opposite is true; the
risk of death is increased five times if a person is thrown from a
vehicle. 54 The third situation mentioned is that of very large
persons, or pregnant women, and Lord Denning M.R. has said that
an exception should be made for these persons. 55 There can be no
objection to this if these groups really are exposed to greater danger
when wearing a seat belt, but one must wonder what happens to
mother and unborn child when they are thrown from an automobile.
It is also possible to argue that the defendant should not be expected
to bear the responsibility for their unusual conditions, but the thin
skull doctrine would appear to cover the point.
On the other side of the argument is the opinion of every
insurance company, safety council and motor association, all of
whom have spent a great deal of time and money promoting the use
of belts. Lord Denning M.R. summed up their conclusions in these
words:
Much material has been put before us about the value of wearing
a seat belt. It shows that everyone in the front seats of a car
should wear a seat belt. Not only on long trips, but also on short
ones. Not only in the town, but also in the country. Not only
where there is fog, but also when it is clear. Not only by fast
drivers, but also by slow ones. Not only on motorways, but also
on side roads.
5 6
Expert evidence has played an important part in many of the seat
b~lt cases, most of it directed toward showing the effectiveness of
the belts. Included in the parade of persons promoting their use have
been police officers, 57 doctors, 58 safety council representa-
54. Id. and Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 294E; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at
526, and see the facts of Parnell v. Shields, [1973] R.T.R. 414 at 418C and Yuan
v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295 at 301; 62 W.W.R. 645 at 652
55. Froom v. Butcher, id. at 295F; [1975] 3 All E.R. at 527; contra, McGee v.
Francis Shaw & Co., [1973] R.T.R. 409
56. Id. at 293E; [1975] 3 All E.R. at 525-26
57. Yuan v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295; 62 W.W.R. 645; Pasternack v.
Poulton, [1973] 2 All E.R. 74; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476
58. Yuan v. Farstad, id. Van Spronsen v. Gawor, [1971] 2 O.R. 729; 19 D.L.R.
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tives,59 motor association representatives, 60 mechanical engineers, 61
statisticians, 62 and automotive engineers. 63 In at least one case it
was held that the issue could be decided without scientific
evidence, 64 but in others the failure to produce such evidence has
been fatal. 6 5 The doctors generally gave evidence concerning not
only the general effectiveness of the seat belts, but also the effect
they would have had in reducing the damage in the particular case.
Hopefully, the effectiveness of seat belts will soon become settled
as a question of law, so that litigants will not be put to the expense
of producing expert testimony, the effect of which is already to be
found in the reports and in numerous documents and studies.
66
IV. Availability and Use
The plaintiff cannot, naturally enough, be held to be negligent
unless it is shown that he did the negligent act; it must be proven
that he did not wear the seat belt. 67 If the safety device was not
available to him, he would also be relieved of liability, unless of
course such availability was due to his own default. It must
therefore also be shown that the car was equipped with seat belts,
6 8
and that they were in good condition and useable. 69 Where there is
(3d) 53; Belanger v. Reid (1974), 11 N.B.R. (2d) 94; 7 A.P.R. 94; Parnell v.
Shields, [1973] R.T.R. 414; Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286; [1975] 3 All
E.R. 520; Freeborn v. Thomas, [1975] R.T.R. 16; Earl v. Bourdon (1975), 65
D.L.R. (3d) 646;Jackson v. Millar, [1973] 1 O.R. 399; 31 D.L.R. (3d) 263;Burtt
v. Davis (1976), 14 N.B.R. (2d) 541; 15 A.P.R. 541; Owens v. Brimmell, [1976] 3
All E.R. 765; [1977] R.T.R. 82
59. Anders v. Sim (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 366; 73 W.W.R. 263 (Alta. S.C., T.D.)
60. Hunt v. Schwanke, [1972] 2 W.W.R. 541
61. Haley v. Richardson (1974), 9 N.B.R. (2d) 318; 1 A.P.R. 318, var'd 10
N.B.R. (2d) 653; Reineke v. Weisgerber (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 239; [1974] 3
W.W.R. 97 (Sask. Q.B.)
62. Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 2 All E.R. 74; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476; Chapman
v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7
63. Chapman v. Ward, id.
64. Jackson v. Millar, [1972] 20.R. 197 at 205; 25 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 168, rev'd
on other grounds [1973] 1 O.R. 399; 31 D.L.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.)
65. MacDonnell v. Kaiser (1968), 3 N.S.R. 1965-69 613 at 627; 68 D.L.R. (2d)
104 at 107;Dover v. Gooddy (1972), 3 N. & P.E.I.R. 143 at 144; 29 D.L.R. (3d)
639 at 640
66. Linden, supra, note 39; Williams, supra, note 3
67. Parnell v. Shields, [1973] R.T.R. 414 at 416; Challoner v. Williams, [1974]
R.T.R. 221 at 222L
68. Yuan v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295 at 302-03; 62 W.W.R. 645 at
653-54; Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 2 All E.R. 74 at 78; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at
480F; Chapman v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7 at 8H
69. Reineke v. Weisgerber (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 239 at 243; [1974] 3 W.W.R.
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no belt in the car one must enquire whether the cost and
inconvenience of refusing to ride in such a vehicle are great enough
to justify the plaintiff running the risk of riding unprotected.
70
Indeed, where there is no seat belt the shoe may be on the other
foot. It could then be argued that the driver or owner was negligent
in failing to provide an accepted safety device.
7'
There has been some suggestion that the driver may not use this
defence if he has not told the passengers of the existence of the
belt, 72 asked them to use it,73 or shown them how it works. 74 Lord
Denning M.R. has, however, said that an adult passenger need not
be told what to do for his own safety. 75 The situation may be
different where the defendant actually discourages the use of the
seat belt. 76 There have also been suggestions that when the driver
himself was not wearing his seat belt, it is not open to him to say
that the passenger was negligent for so acting. 77 How the driver's
negligence can affect the fact that the passenger was also negligent,
or how in such a case the driver's negligence in not wearing a seat
belt can be a cause of the plaintiff's injuries is not explained.
It has also been suggested that the plaintiff must have actual
knowledge of the existence of the belts. 78 This would seem to
impose a subjective rather than an objective test. Surely the
reasonable person is aware that most cars are now required by law to
be equipped with seat belts? One can hardly fail to notice their
existence in most cars, and in any case it would only take a second's
97 at 112; Chapman v. Ward, id. at 14E; Parnell v. Shields, [1973] R.T.R. 414 at
418D; Jackson v. Millar, [1972] 2 O.R. 197 at 205; 25 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 168,
rev'd on other grounds [1973] 1 O.R. 399; 31 D.L.R. (3d) 263
70. Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850; [1951] 1 All E.R. 1078. cf. Freeborn v.
Thomas, [1975] R.T.R. 16 at 19G
71. Ware's Taxi Ltd. v. Gilliham, [1949] S.C.R. 637; [1949] 3 D.L.R. 721;
Mbrtensen v. Southern Pacific Co. (1966), 245 Cal. App. 2d 241; 53 Cal. Rptr.
851 (Dist. C.A.); Paris v. Stepney Borough Council, [1951] A.C. 367; [1951] 1
All E.R. 42; 84 LI. L. Rep. 525 (H.L. (E.))
72. James v. Parsons, [1975] R.T.R. 20 at 24B; Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 2
All E.R. 74 at 80; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at 483
73. Beaver v. Crowe (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 114 at 120;Drage v. Smith, [1975]
R.T.R. 1 at 6K;Pasternack v. Poulton, id. at 80; [1973] 1 W.L.R. at 482H
74. Geier v. Kujawa, [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 364
75. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 296F; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at 528;
Beaver v. Crowe (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 114 at 121
76. Chapman v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7 at 13-14
77. Id. at 14G. See alsoReineke v. Weisgerber (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 239 at 243;
[1974] 3 W.W.R. 97 at 113
78. Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 2 All E.R. 74 at 78; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at
480F; James v. Parsons, [1975] R.T.R. 20 at 23K, 24C
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time to ascertain if they are fitted. The better view would seem to be
that availability does not require actual knowledge or conscious
awareness of the belts. 
79
V. Causation
The final step in proving contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is to prove causation. There is no negligence without
damage, and the plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt is of no
consequence unless it can be shown that the injuries suffered would
in fact have been less if the belt had been used. Probably more cases
have failed on this point than on any other. 80 This may be one
reason why few of the cases where the defence was not recognized
were appealed, for there was often a concurrent finding that
causation was not proven. While an Appeal Court might be willing
to reverse on the question of law as to the standard of care, they
would not be inclined to overturn the factual ruling that causation
was not shown.
It may well be that judges who are reluctant to throw part of the
loss onto the plaintiff's shoulders use this factor to defeat the
defence. There have been some exacting standards of proof set. In
Rigler v. Miller, McIntryre J. was not willing to assume that an
injury to the nose, probably caused by hitting the dashboard, would
have been prevented by a seat belt. 81 In Lertora v. Finzi, Fay J.
would not hold that facial injuries caused by glass, where the
windshield was smashed, would have been prevented. 82 In some
cases where several persons were not wearing seat belts causation of
the damage was proven for one passenger but not for another. 83 As
was mentioned, 84 medical doctors have been used effectively to
79. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 295E; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at 527;
Haley v. Richardson (1974), 9 N.B.R. (2d) 318 at 330; 1 A.P.R. 318 at 330, affd
on thispoint 10 N.B.R. (2d) 653
80. See, e.g., Heppell v. Irving Oil Co. (1974), 6 N.B.R. (2d) 327; 40 D.L.R.
(3d) 476; Belanger v. Reid (1974), 11 N.B.R. (2d) 94; 7 A.P.R. 94; Beaver v.
Crowe (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 114; Burtt v. Davis (1976), 14 N.B.R. (2d) 541; 15
A.P.R. 541; Linden, supra, note 39 at 480
81. (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 366 (B.C.S.C.). See also Smith v. Blackburn, [1974]
R.T.R. 533; [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 229
82. [1973] R.T.R. 161, and see Owens v. Brimmell, [1976] 3 All E.R. 765; [1977]
R.T.R. 82
83. Froom v. Butcher, [1974] 3 All E.R. 517 at 519; [1974] R.T.R 528 at 530J,
rev'd on other grounds [1976] Q.B. 286; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520; Yuan v. Farstad
(1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295 at 303; 62 W.W.R. 645 at 654
84. Supra, note 58
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prove that the plaintiff's injuries would have been reduced if a seat
belt had been worn, and a question to this effect should be put to
them while they are testifying. Where another passenger who was
wearing a belt suffers no injury, the courts will probably be more
willing to find causation. 8 5 One would think that in some instances
the courts should be willing to conclude from the very nature of the
injuries that they would have been prevented. 
8 6
The seat belt cases are an interesting example of the application
of apportionment statutes, for in them it is not alleged that the
plaintiff's negligence caused the accident but rather that it caused
the damage. This aspect of the defence has been noted in a number
of cases, 8 7 but it has never been seriously contested that this is a bar
to the defendant's claim, although the question was reserved in one
case.88 The issue was settled in England in O'Connell v. Jackson,
89 a case involving the non-use of a helmet while riding a motor
cycle, where it was decided that contribution to the damage is
sufficient. In Canada most of the apportionment statutes speak of
fault causing "damage or loss", and these words appear to be wide
enough to encompass the situation. 90
VI. Procedure
Once the four elements of the defence have been proven it is
necessary to apportion the damages. The only damages that are
subject to apportionment are the extra damages, those that would
have been prevented by wearing the seat belt, 91 and even here the
defendant who has negligently caused the accident must bear the
major part of the loss. 92 It has been argued that the plaintiff's
85. McGee v. Francis Shaw & Co., [1973] R.T.R. 409 at 413F
86. Toperoff v. Mor, [1973] R.T.R. 419 at 421F; Parnell v. Shields, [1973]
R.T.R. 414
87. Yuan v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295 at 300; 62 W.W.R. 645 at 651;
Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 292D; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at 525;
Jackson v. Millar, [1972] 2 O.R. 197 at 209-10; 25 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 173-74,
rev'don other grounds [1973] 1 O.R. 399; 31 D.L.R. (3d) 263
88. Chapman v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7 at 9A
89. [1972] 1 Q.B. 270; [1971] 3 All E.R. 129; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 354 (C.A.);
Davies v. Swan Motors (Swansea) Co., [1949] 2 K.B. 291 at 326-27; [1949] 1 All
E.R. 620 at 632-33
90. For example, Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 54, s. 1(1), and
see Spike v. Roche, [1955] 5 D.L.R. 385 at 392-93; 37 M.P.R. 57 at 66-67 (Nfld.
S.C.)
91. Linden, supra, note 39 at480
92. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 295G, [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at 527;
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negligence, in terms of the chain of causation, is completely
responsible for all this extra damage, and so he should recover
nothing for it, but this argument has yet to be accepted in England or
Canada. 93
The apportionment procedure is best illustrated by an example.
Assume that the defendant is one hundred per cent at fault for an
accident in which the plaintiff suffered $2500 in damages. Assume
further that if a seat belt had been worn the damages would only
have been $1000. Remember that in Canada apportionment is on the
basis of fault or negligence. 94 Since the defendant was entirely at
fault for the accident he must bear all the initial $1000 of loss. For
the remaining $1500 it is necessary to determine the relative fault of
the plaintiff and the defendant. This requires a comparison of the
relative extent to which each party departed from the standards of
the reasonable man. The plaintiff's amount of fault will depend on
the circumstances in which the belt was not worn, and on whether or
not a conscious decision was made not to wear it. 95 The defendant
may be slightly or grossly negligent. Assume that in the particular
case the ratio of the defendant's fault to the plaintiff's fault was
eighty to twenty. The plaintiff will then receive only eighty per cent
of the additional $1500 damages or $1200.
In fact the courts have not followed this theoretically correct
approach. In many cases it is impossible to tell exactly what injuries
would have been suffered if the belt had been worn. 96 Some judges
have used this problem of proof to deny recovery, as was mentioned
above, but others have attempted to do rough justice by reducing the
whole damage award by some percentage, taking into account the
relative fault and causation factor at the same time. 97 Of course
Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973] 2 All E.R. 74 at 80; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476 at 483;
[1973] R.T.R. 334 at 343; Yuan v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295 at 303; 62
W.W.R. 645 at 654
93. McGee v. Francis Shaw & Co., [1973] R.T.R. 409 at 413G. See Linden,
supra, note 39 at 481 for the American position
94. Supra, note 90. In England it is on the basis of what is "just and equitable
having regard to the claimant's share in responsibility for the damage". Law
Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28, s. 1(I) (U.K.)
95. McGee v. Francis Shaw & Co., [1973] R.T.R. 409 at 413J
96. Haley v. Richardson (1974), 9 N.B.R. (2d) 318 at 330; 1 A.P.R. 318 at 330,
var'd 10 N.B.R. (2d) 653
97. For example, Yuan v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295; 62 W.W.R. 645.
This resembles the English approach where causative potency and blameworthiness
are measured together. See Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286; [1975] 3 All E.R.
520, and note 94
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where the seat belt would have prevented all the injury this approach
is theoretically correct too. 98 In some cases the plaintiff may be
partly responsible for causing the accident, as well as being
negligent in not wearing a seat belt. Thus, in Earl v. Bourdon, 99
the plaintiff's damages were reduced by seventy-five per cent to
allow for his total responsibility in causing the damage, without any
attempt being made to determine what part of the damage could
have been prevented by a seat belt. It is submitted that the more
general approach to the apportionment of damages does better
justice between the parties, and requires nothing more than a looser
interpretation of the statutory requirement that damages are to be
apportioned according to fault. That is, there would appear to be no
reason why causation and fault cannot be measured at the same
time.
VII. Legislative Activity
The seat belt cases provide an interesting example of the way the
courts use legislative activity to develop new common law duties.
Initially there was just the opinion of researchers and safety experts
as to whether or not the belts should be used. As was noted above
some judges were willing to accept this as sufficient to create a duty
to use the belts while others were not. In England, the first piece of
legislative action was the inclusion in the Highway Code of a
provision to the effect that seat belts should be installed and worn.
This code is published by the British government for the general
interest of motorists, and contains suggested procedures on all
aspects of use of the highways. A breach of the Highway Code
involves no liability of itself, but under the Road Traffic Act,
1972100 its provisions are evidence in civil actions of what is
reasonable conduct on the road. The Highway Code does not create
a presumption of negligence, 10 1 and in many of the English cases
the judges had no difficulty in holding that the failure to wear a seat
belt was not negligence, despite the recommendation that this is
good practice. 10 2 In the end, however, its influence was felt, the
98. Pasternack v. Poulton, [1973) 2 All E.R. 74; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 476;Drage v.
Smith, [1975] R.T.R. 1;Jackson v. Millar, [1973] 1 O.R. 399; 31 D.L.R. (3d) 263
99. (1975), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 646, and see Lertora v. Finzi, [1973] R.T.R. 161
(Q.B.D.), where the plaintiff was held partly to blame for the accident.
100. (1972), c. 20, s. 37(5) (U.K.)
101. Powell v. Phillips, [1972)3 All E.R. 864; [1973] R.T.R. 19 (C.A.)
102. Freeborn v. Thomas, [1975] R.T.R. 16; Smith v. Blackburn, [1974] R.T.R.
533; [1974)2 Lloyd's Rep. 229
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Court of Appeal using the advice that it contains as one reason why
the non-use of a seat belt should be classed as an unreasonable
act.10
3
There is no equivalent to the Highway Code in Canada, and here
the first legislative step taken was to require the installation of seat
belts in all new cars, without making their use compulsory. 10 4 This
type of provision has been noted by the courts, 10 5 but has not been
found to be sufficient on its own to create a legal duty to wear a seat
belt. Such a requirement should, however, have an impact on the
argument over the general effectiveness of seat belts. As was noted
above, this is one of the four factors that must be proved to make out
the defence, and a statute making it mandatory to provide a certain
safety device should be almost conclusive evidence that that device
is generally of some value in reducing injuries.
After providing the motorist with seat belts in the hope that
injuries suffered on the highways would thereby be reduced, many
legislatures were dismayed to find that people seldom used them. 10
6
The dismay increased when the legislators realized that publicly
funded health plans were bearing a large proportion of the costs
incurred in treating injuries that result from road accidents. 10 7 The
safety experts started advocating the enactment of legislation that
would make the wearing of the belts compulsory. This may have
been the wise course to take, but it certainly was not the best
political course to take. The initial Ontario response, which is
representative of other jurisdictions, was "an educational en-
deavor", an advertising campaign to promote the use of the
belts.108 A similar programme was mounted in England, and Lord
Denning M.R. made note of that fact when deciding that there was a
duty at law to wear a seat belt. 10 9 Despite the large sums invested in
these programmes (which must be taken to be an indication of
legislative opinion as to the desirability of using the belts), the
103. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 293H; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at 526
104. Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations, S.O.R. 70-487, R. 9(1) made under the
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 26, s.7
105. Yuan v. Farstad (1967), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 295 at 302; 62 W.W.R. 645 at 654;
Van Spronsen v. Gaivor, [1971] 2 O.R. 729 at 730; 19 D.L.R. (3d) 53 at 54
106. Linden, supra, note 39 at 483; Williams, supra, note 3 at 119
107. Supra, note 35 (estimated at $90 million per year in Ontario)
108. Ont. Leg. Debates, (June 9, 1975) at 2704
109. Froom v. Butcher, [1976] Q.B. 286 at 294C; [1975] 3 All E.R. 520 at 526;
also Chapman v. Ward, [1975] R.T.R. 7 at 13
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government propaganda has not had much visible impact on the
Canadian decisions.
The ultimate legislative step is, of course, to make the wearing of
the belts compulsory. This step has now been taken in Ontario,11O
Quebec, 111 and Nova Scotia, 112 although in the latter the legislation
has never been proclaimed. The impact that these statutes will have
on the seat belt defence varies. The Nova Scotian statute contains
the following provision:
10(14) The use or non-use of restraint equipment by operators or
passengers shall not be evidence of negligence in any civil action.
This would appear to be an attempt to abolish the seat belt defence
in civil actions. The section may, however, only mean that non-use
by itself is not to be found to be negligence. This interpretation
would not prevent evidence on non-use of a seat belt being
introduced along with evidence of other unreasonable conduct on
the part of the plaintiff to prove negligence. Thus, this section
would have the effect of requiring that the defendant prove in each
particular case that it was, on the facts of that case, negligent to fail
to wear a seat belt; it could never automatically be negligent to fail
to wear a seat belt. 113 This section may not abolish the defence for
another reason. Under the Nova Scotia Contributory Negligence
Act it is not necessary to prove negligence to bring about
apportionment of damages, it is only necessary to prove "fault". 114
The breach of a penal statute may be sufficient fault for the purposes
of apportionment where the statute is aimed at preventing the very
danger that arose. 115 A strict interpretation of the penal statute and
the apportionment statute would therefore render meaningless at
least one section of the former.
The Quebec statute contains a similar provision which reads:
56n. Failure to comply with section 56d, 56e, 56i, or 56j shall
not be considered in determining the amount of damages in a civil
case.
10. The Highway Traffic Amendment Act, 1975 (2nd sess.) (No. 2), S.0. 1975
(2nd sess.), c. 14, s. 1
I 11. An Act to Amend the Highway Code (1976), Quebec, 30th Legislature, 4th
session, Bill 13, s. 14
112. An Act to Amend the Motor Vehicle Act, S.N.S. 1974, c. 42, s. 10
113. Supra, note 39
114. Supra, note 94
115. Harris v. Toronto Transit Commissioners, [1967] S.C.R. 460 at 466-67; 63
D.LR. (2d) 450 at 456-57; Canning v. The King, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 118 (S.C.)
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The obvious reaction to this wording is that the failure to comply
could never affect the amount of damages in a civil suit. The
damages must remain the same in quantum, the only question is
how the damages are to be apportioned between the two parties. The
section does not say that failure to comply with the listed sections
shall not affect the apportionment of damages in a civil case.
Assuming that these actions were designed to abolish the seat belt
defence in civil cases, one must ask why the legislatures thought
this to be a desirable policy. It may have been thought that the seat
belt defence did not exist in the jurisdictions in question, with these
provisions being included so that the penal statute would not alter
the civil law. This, however, would involve at least a tacit approval
of the present state of the law. It is submitted that this must mean
that the legislature is of the view either that the risk of using the
highways is not unreasonable, or that the effectiveness of seat belts
has not been proven. If this is so then it is difficult to see why the
use of seat belts would be made compulsory. In summary, if these
sections were enacted to maintain the existing civil law, it would
appear as if the legislatures are acting on conflicting assumptions
regarding the value of seat belts in different sections of the same
statute.
The provisions abolishing the seat belt defence may have been
included because of a belief that the defence only assists insurance
companies in escaping from their contractual obligations. 116 Where
both parties have insurance the defence can, of course, only have
the effect of shifting liability from one insurance company to
another, without affecting the victim's compensation. In some
cases, however, one party may not have insurance, or access to
insurance may be blocked by contract or statute. For example there
may be contractual limitations on who may recover on a policy, on
what type of damage is compensable, or on the quantum of damages
recoverable under the insurance policy. The "guest passenger"
legislation, which requires proof of gross negligence on the part of
the driver before liability arises, may also block the passenger's
access to his driver's insurance. In these cases, where the victim is
unable to recover from the insurer of the car in which he was riding,
the sections abolishing the seat belt defence in civil actions would
have the effect of compensating the victim at the expense of the
116. Ont. Leg. Debates (November 25, 1975) at 943 and (December 2, 1975) at
1176
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defendant's insurer, who is presumably better able to spread the loss
among the motoring public as a whole. However, if it is the
defendant who is without access to insurance, these actions will
cause all the loss to fall on the shoulders of one of two parties who
have both been at fault. In such a case it is possible that it will be the
plaintiff's insurer who will escape liability.
In Ontario, the statute is silent as to the effect it is to have on civil
proceedings. Before the first of these Acts was passed it was
suggested in some of the cases that a compulsory use law would
strengthen the case against the plaintiff. 1 7 Shaw J. disagreed
saying that while under such an act
Failure to use a seat belt may attract penalties to the offender, it is
to be expected that the duty to use the belt will be regarded as
having been imposed for the benefit of the potential victim of
another's negligence and not as a ground for diminishing the
liability of a bad driver to pay compensation. 11
Whether or not a penal statute raises a corresponding civil duty has
always been a difficult question for the courts, sending them off in
search of a non-existent legislative intention. -19 There is a clear
legislative policy here to protect the motorist, and the courts might
justifiably attempt to promote compliance with the statute by
super-imposing civil liability on the fine. There is also Sterling
Trusts v. Postma in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that
the breach of a statutory provision designed to promote highway
safety was prima facie proof of negligence.' 20 The reasoning
behind this decision was, however, based on a desire to compensate
an injured party who suffered, partly at least, from the breach of
statute. In the seat belt cases all that the lawbreaker has done is
injure himself, and the same considerations may not apply.
Allowing the defence would mean that the lawbreaker would be
bearing the loss, as in the Postma case. Denying it would mean that
the defendant would not be allowed to take advantage of the breach
of statute that was not designed to protect him anyway, and through
which he has not himself suffered damage. At the same time,
though, this may mean that the plaintiff is being allowed to allege a
117. Beaver v. Crowe (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 114 at 118; Hunt v. Schwanke,
[197212 W.W.R. 541 at 544; Van Spronsen v. Gawor, [1971] 2 O.R. 729 at 730;
19 D.L.R. (3d) 53 at 54
118. Challoner v. Williams, [1974] R.T.R. 221 at 225
119. Linden, supra, note 14 at 85; Fleming, supra, note 12 at 122
120. [1965] S.C.R. 324 at 330; 48 D.L.R. (2d) 423 at429
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breach of statute against the defendant (in relation to the cause of the
accident), but that the defendant may not hold the plaintiff to the
same standard. The equity of the situation may require applying the
same standard to both parties. On the other hand it would also
appear desirable to compensate the victim or his family when his
bad judgement catches up with him, rather than saying "I told you
so." It is difficult to predict whether or not the courts will balance
these competing factors in such a way that the penal statute will give
rise to a corresponding civil duty.
There may, however, be a shorter answer to the question of
whether the statute creates a civil duty. As was mentioned above it
may not be necessary to go so far as to show that the plaintiff is
negligent. This would make it unnecessary to show that the penal
provision of the act sets a standard applicable to civil actions. The
various contributory negligence acts provide for apportionment
where the "fault" of a party causes damage. 121 While this certainly
includes negligence it is not necessarily confined to it. It has been
suggested, in a case where the statutory provision in question was
clearly aimed at the safety of the plaintiff, that a breach of statute is
itself "fault" within the meaning of the Acts. 122 Should the courts
be willing to apply this authority it will have the effect of making
the motorist strictly liable for the non-use of a seat belt where a
statute makes use compulsory.
The Ontario statute provides an exemption from penalties for
persons who have written excuses from their doctors or who are
engaged in driving that involves frequent stops. One could argue
that this provides evidence that for these types of people it is
reasonable not to wear a belt. The contrary view would be that when
these persons avail themselves of the privilege of not wearing a seat
belt they do so at their own risk, and cannot expect the defendant to
pay for any resulting damage. Again the courts will most likely take
the route that compensates the victim, given the legislative
acquiescence to the non-use of the belts by these groups.
VIII. Conclusion
In closing it may be useful to summarize the present status of the
seat belt defence in the various jurisdictions. In England it is firmly
121. Supra, note 90, except in Manitoba where "negligence" is used: R.S.M.
1970, c. T90, s. 4(1)
122. Supra, note 115
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established. 123 In Quebec it has been abolished by statute, if it ever
existed. 124 A similar result may obtain in Nova Scotia if the
legislation there is proclaimed, but at present the law is
uncertain. 125 The defence appears to be well established in New
Brunswick, 126 British Columbia, 127 and Ontario.1 28 The statute in
the latter province can only serve to strengthen the already accepted
arguments. On the other hand it would seem that Prince Edward
Island, 129 Alberta, 130 and Saskatchewan' 31 have rejected the
defence, there being no case recognizing it reported from any of
these provinces. Manitoba, Newfoundland, and the territories have
no reported judgments.
The future of the defence in Canada must depend largely on
whether there is more legislation making the use of seat belts
compulsory, or alternatively, legislation abolishing the defence. It
is submitted that if the common law is left to develop by itself the
defence will come to be increasingly recognized by the courts. The
arguments presented against the defence are generally weak, and the
risks present in the use of the highways and the general
effectiveness of the seat belt have now been sufficiently
demonstrated to give the seat belt defence a firm claim to
recognition by the law.
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Addendum: Since this article was written the following additional
cases have been reported - Jones v. Johnson (1975), 18 N.S.R.
(2d) 67 (N.S.S.C., T.D.); Gagnon v. Beaulieu, [1977] 1 W.W.R.
702 (B.C.S.C.).
